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FEDERAL LABOR LAW PREEMPTION OF STATE ANTITAKEOVER LAW: A CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION-Air Line
Pilots Association, Internationalv. UAL Corp., 874 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.
1989).
Abstract: Federal labor laws generally preempt statelaws that conflict
with or frustrate the federal labor scheme. In Air Line Pilots Association, Internationalv. UAL Corp., the Seventh Circuit held that federal
law did not preempt an anti-takeover statute that invalidated anti-takeover provisions in a collective bargaining agreement. This Note analyzes
the court's holding and suggests that the court misapplied judicial precedent. Because state anti-takeover laws as applied to labor agreements
conflict with and frustrate the federal labor scheme, this Note concludes
that these state laws should be preempted.
Corporate takeovers, while not a new phenomenon, have taken on a
new character in recent years. Takeover attempts often result in reorganization, restructuring, or dismemberment of target corporations.
These changes, whether made by successful bidders or management,
can jeopardize employee job security.1
To assure job security, labor organizations representing corporate
employees may desire to negotiate with management to establish protective devices to make tender offers less likely or to maintain job
security if tender offers succeed.2 Federal labor law governs such
negotiations.3 After labor organizations or management initiate these
negotiations, however, the potential for conflict with state law arises.
While Congress has federalized most labor law, it has left the regulation of corporate management to the states.4
1. See Pitt, Williams, Perna, Riordan, Thornton & Wilder, Tender Offers: Offensive and
Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 1 HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL, 1989, at 293 (Practicing Law Institute 1989) ("many bidders intend to reorganize,
restructure, or even sell off parts of the target company"); O'Brien & Kline, An Rxfor Jobs Lost
Through Mergers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1987, § 4, at 23, col. 2 (self-cannibalizing by companies
fighting unwelcome mergers usually entails company retrenchment: Owens Coming could cut its
workforce of 28,000 by 13,000 when restructuring to defeat a takeover bid).
2. The machinists' union actively pursued anti-takeover provisions in Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
Int'l v. UAL Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1309, 1316 (N.D. II. 1988) (UAL Corp. I), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 874 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1989) (UAL Corp. II).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 10-22.
4. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987). State law applies
the business judgment rule in defining the duties of corporate directors. See, eg., Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). In the face of takeover attempts,
directors must prove they acted in good faith and with reasonable investigation. Id. at 954-55.
In addition, corporate management must prove that any defensive actions taken in the face of a
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Federal courts first addressed the conflict between federal labor law
and state corporate anti-takeover law in Air Line Pilots Association,
Internationalv. UAL Corp.5 In this case, UAL's management reached
a collective bargaining agreement with the machinists' union that
included provisions aimed at discouraging a pending tender offer by
the pilots' association. The pilots' association brought suit against
UAL and the machinists to invalidate these provisions. 6 Resolution of
this case required the courts to consider whether federal labor law preempted the application of state anti-takeover law.7 The district court
held that federal labor law preempted state law.' On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that state law was not preempted.9 This
Note analyzes the Seventh Circuit's holding and concludes that
Supreme Court precedent dictates that collective bargaining agreements made in accordance with federal labor law preempt state antitakeover law.
I.

THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL REGULATION
IN THE LABOR FIELD

A.

Labor Negotiations and Agreements Under FederalLaw

The federal government has exercised its authority over labor negotiations in two major statutes, the Railway Labor Act (RLA)' ° and the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).11 These statutes regulate the
process of negotiations and define certain areas over which parties
hostile takeover bid were reasonable in relation to the threat posed to shareholders by the bid. Id.
at 955.
5. 699 F. Supp 1309 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (UAL Corp. 1). On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 874 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.) (UAL Corp. II), on remand, 717
F. Supp. 575 (N.D. I11.1989) (UAL Corp. III).
6. UAL Corp. 11, 874 F.2d at 443.
7. The courts also considered two substantive issues that this Note does not address. First, in
UAL Corp. L the district court held that section C of the labor agreement violated the Railway
Labor Act, but noted that this technical flaw could easily be remedied. 699 F. Supp. at 1331.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed this holding. UAL Corp. I, 874 F.2d at 445. Second, on remand,
the district court held that anti-takeover provisions in labor contracts necessarily violate
Delaware law because their irredeemable nature makes them unreasonable in response to
takeover threats. UAL Corp. IlL 717 F. Supp. at 588. The court contrasted these irredeemable
provisions with defensive measures in articles of incorporation that the corporation's board or
shareholders may unilaterally revoke. Id.
8. UAL Corp. Z 699 F. Supp. at 1334.
9. UAL Corp. IL 874 F.2d at 447.
10. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982). The RLA covers labor relations in the railroad and airline
fields.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982). The NLRA covers labor relations in most nonpublic fields
not covered under the RLA.
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must negotiate; they do not, however, regulate the substance of the
agreements that parties reach.12
Once company employees have voted for a union representative,
courts characterize RLA disputes either as minor or major. 3 Major
disputes concern the formation or alteration of collective bargaining
agreements and arise when either management or labor wishes to
change the collective bargaining agreement.1 4 Parties to a major dispute must follow the mandatory procedures set out in RLA section
156 which requires carriers and representatives of the employees to
give at least thirty days notice of an intended change in agreements
affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. 5 While section
156 is limited to matters of pay, rules, and working conditions, courts
have interpreted these mandatory bargaining areas to include a broad
16
range of topics.
Interpreting the collective bargaining duties imposed by the
NLRA, 17 the Supreme Court has characterized the topics for bargaining as illegal,1- permissive, 19 and mandatory. Mandatory topics of
bargaining define and control the relationship between the employer
and the union2" and include the broadly defined areas of wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment.21 The NLRA also
12. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960).
13. See, eg., Elgin J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945), aff'd on rehearing,327
U.S. 661 .(1946). Minor disputes involve the interpretation or application of existing collective
bargaining agreements. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1982).
14. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
15. Id.
16. Courts have held that the RLA requires bargaining over forms and levels of
compensation, California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 555, 559-60 (1957); job security, Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330, 336-38 (1960); length and term of
employment, id.; and labor protective provisions related to the effects of an abandonment or sale.
Pittsburgh & L. E. R.R. Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (1989).
See generally H. LUSTGARTEN, PRINCIPLES OF RAILROAD AND AIRLINE LABOR LAW 52-68
(1984).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1982).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 158; see NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 360
(1958) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Illegal topics are those specifically
prohibited under the NLRA's provisions, such as bargaining to limit hiring to union members,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), and bargaining for hot cargo provisions, id § 158(e). See generally
A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 436 (9th ed. 1981).
19. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349. Permissive topics usually concern the internal
management of the union or employer. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 523-29 (1976).
20. R. GORMAN, supra note- 19, at 497.

21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 159(a) (1982); see Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349. Mandatory
subjects include profit-sharing plans, Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 961-62
(2d Cir. 1987); NLRB v. Black-Clawson Co., 210 F.2d 523, 524 (6th Cir. 1954); stock-purchase
plans, Richfield Oil Corp. v. .NLRB, 231 F.2d 717, 724 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 909

459

Washington Law Review

Vol. 65:457, 1990

mandates that management and labor negotiate over "other mutual
aid or protection." 22
B. FederalLabor Law Preemption
Federal labor law preempts state law that conflicts with or frustrates
the purposes of the RLA or NLRA. Within this broad scope of preemption, bargaining agreement preemption displaces state law that
limits the content of labor agreements.
1.

The Scope of Preemption Under the RLA and NLRA

Article VI of the United States Constitution states that the federal
Constitution and federal laws are "the supreme Law of the Land."2 3
Under the Supremacy Clause, federal laws may preempt state laws
that create duties contrary to federal duties, that undermine federal
purposes, or that operate in fields occupied exclusively by federal
law.24 In the area of labor, Congress has never entirely occupied the
field nor stated explicitly to what extent federal law preempts state
law.2 5 Consequently, courts will uphold a local regulation "unless it
conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme." 2 6
Applying these general standards, courts have developed complex
preemption doctrines for both the RLA and NLRA.2 7 RLA and
NLRA preemption decisions fall into four areas: bargaining agree(1956); contract expiration dates, NLRB v. Bricklayers & Masons Int'l Union, Local No. 3, 405
F.2d 469, 470-71 n.1 (9th Cir. 1968); and effects of decisions to discontinue business, First Nat'l
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677-78 n.15, 681 (1981).
22. Section 151 declares the federal policy to encourage "the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining" by worker representatives "for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
Because the statute identifies "other mutual aid or protection" as separate from the terms and
conditions of employment, negotiations over these mandatory areas must be in addition to terms
and conditions of employment. No court, however, has applied or interpreted the meaning of
this phrase.
23. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl.
2.
24. See Malone v. White Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824).
25. Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
26. Malone, 435 U.S. at 504; accord Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 394 U.S. 369, 381 (1969); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
343-44 (1959).
27. While the preemption standards for these two acts are similar, the Supreme Court has
warned that they are not interchangeable. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 394 U.S. at 383.
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ment preemption,2" bargaining process preemption,2 9 primary jurisdiction preemption,3 0 and contract interpretation preemption.3 '
2. BargainingAgreement Preemption Under the RLA and NLRA
Courts apply bargaining agreement preemption to displace state
laws that limit the content of labor agreements. Congress has never
clearly defined the appropriate scope of bargaining; therefore, federal

labor laws give limited guidance for the application of bargaining
agreement preemption. Although parties are free to bargain about any
32
legal subject, Congress created basic areas of mandatory bargaining.
Even within these mandatory areas, Congress chose to leave the specific terms of collective bargaining agreements to the parties. 33 Consequently, courts hold as preempted state laws that attempt to dictate
what terms parties may include in collective bargaining agreements.
Bargaining agreements preempt state law for two reasons. First,
states interfere with the bargaining process by dictating what parties
may include in a contract. 34 The Supreme Court has held that states
may not render bargaining meaningless by controlling what subjects
the parties may include in the final contract.3 1 Second, state laws con28. This Note focuses on this type of preemption.
29. Federal labor law does not define the content of bargaining agreements, but does establish
a process for reaching such agreements. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477,
490 (1960). Courts employ bargaining process preemption to preempt state laws that interfere
with this federally defined process. Brotherhoodof R.R. Trainmen, 394 U.S. at 381 (applying the
RLA to preempt state laws that interfere with the use of self-help weapons); Lodge 76, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140, 149 (1976) (applying
the NLRA to preempt state laws that disrupt the balance between labor and management).
30. Primary jurisdiction preemption occurs when state law arguably infringes on a federal
agency's specific jurisdiction. See Andrews v. Louisville & N. R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 322-24 (1972)
(the primary jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board preempts state law);
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246 (the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
preempts state law).
31. State law claims that depend on interpretation of terms in labor contracts can destroy the
uniformity of labor-related federal common law; therefore, courts apply contract interpretation
preemption to hold these state law claims preempted. See Leu v. Norfolk, 820 F.2d 825, 829 (7th
Cir. 1987) (applying the RLA to preempt state law); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
202, 220 (1985) (applying the NLRA to preempt state law).
32. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981); see supra notes 10-22
and accompanying text.
33. Id. at 675-76 & n.14.
34. "What are proper subject matters for collective bargaining should be left in the first
instance to employers and trade-unions .... [Collective bargaining] cannot be and should not be
straight-jacketed by legislative enactment." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1947)
(minority report), reprinted in SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABORMANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 292, 362 (1974) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 245].

35. Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 296 (1959).
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flict with federally sanctioned collective bargaining agreements by
deeming the provisions of such agreements illegal.3 6 The Supreme
Court has held that congressional authorization of the bargaining pro37
cess endows collective agreements with the authority of federal law.
Thus, federal law preempts state laws that obstruct bargaining or conflict with federally authorized agreements.3 8
Courts have applied bargaining agreement preemption under the
RLA. In the leading case of Californiav. Taylor,3 9 the Supreme Court
held that a collective bargaining agreement preempted the application
of conflicting California civil service laws. 4 Other courts have preempted state statutes of limitations4 1 and state industrial commission
orders42 when the state laws have conflicted with labor agreements.
The Supreme Court also has considered bargaining agreement preemption under the NLRA. First, in Local 24, InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Oliver,43 the Court held that a federally

sanctioned collective bargaining agreement providing minimal rental
fees for independent truck owner-operators preempted an Ohio antitrust law prohibiting price-fixing.' The Court concluded that there
was no room in the labor scheme for the application of state policies
that limited bargaining solutions.4 5 Later, in Malone v. White Motor
Corp.,4 6 the Court held that a bargaining agreement did not preempt a

Minnesota law that established minimum pension standards, because
Congress envisioned such state regulation. a7 In dictum, however, the
48
Court explained that it had not departed from its holding in Oliver.
Taken together, Oliver and Malone establish a general rule for bargaining agreement preemption. 49
36. Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S 225, 232 (1956); see infra note 93.
37. Id.
38. Oliver, 358 U.S. at 296.
39. 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
40. Id. at 561.
41. Crockett v. Union Terminal Co., 342 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
42. United Air Lines v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 211 Cal. App. 2d 729, 28 Cal. Rptr. 238,
245 (1963).
43. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
44. Id. at 296.
45. Id.
46. 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
47. Id. at 514. Three dissenting justices in Malone felt that the Oliver standard justified
preemption of the Minnesota law. See id. at 515 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 516 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
48. Id. at 514.
49. Comment, NLRA Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Claims, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 635,
647 (1983).

Labor Law Preemption of Anti-Takeover Law
In applying bargaining agreement preemption, the Supreme Court
has established three limited exceptions under which courts will not
hold state law preempted. The Court recognizes exceptions for those
areas that Congress intended to leave open for state regulation,50 for
laws that regulate local health and safety,51 and for state legislation
52
that imposes minimal substantive requirements on contract terms.
II. AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL V
UAL CORP.
In Air Line Pilots Association, International v. UAL Corp.,5 3 the
54
association representing the pilots of UAL Corporation (UAL)
planned a tender offer for all of UAL's common stock. UAL's
machinists, fearing that the pilots would reduce machinist wages, benefits, and employment levels if the takeover succeeded,55 proposed
anti-takeover provisions during labor negotiations with UAL's management.5 6 The machinists and management agreed to include two
provisions in the machinists' collective bargaining agreement. First,
section B(1)(b) provided that if a takeover succeeded the union could
unilaterally serve a notice to initiate negotiations; if these negotiations
proved unsuccessful, the machinists could strike.57 Second, section C
required UAL to offer all unionized employees an employee stock
option plan (ESOP) under prescribed conditions if a takeover succeeded.58 This provision would have significantly diluted the pilots'
ownership and control upon takeover.
The pilots' association sued UAL and the machinists to enjoin the
anti-takeover sections. The pilots alleged that section C violated the
RLA, and sections B(1)(b) and C violated Delaware anti-takeover
law.59 The UAL Corp. courts addressed a corollary issue raised:
whether federal labor law preempted the application of state anti-take50. Malone, 435 U.S. at 514; see infra text accompanying notes 100-03.
51. Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 297 (1959); see infra text
accompanying note 104.
52. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 754-55 (1985); see infra text
accompanying note 105.
53. 874 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1989). For the procedural history of this case, see supra note 5.
54. UAL Corporation, formerly known as Allegis Corporation, is the parent company of
United Air Lines.
55. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (UAL
Corp. I).
56. Id. at 1316-26.
57. Id at 1326. This provision reiterates the statutory rights of the union under section 156
of the RLA. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
58. UAL Corp. I 699 F. Supp. at 1326.
59. This Note does not address either of these substantive issues. See supra note 7.
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over law to invalidate provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement.
The district court held that the RLA preempted Delaware antitakeover law. 6' First, the court invoked bargaining agreement preemption, holding that the state law would frustrate the purposes of the
RLA.6 t Second, the court applied contract interpretation preemption,
holding that any violation of state law depended on the interpretation
of a labor agreement.62
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that this case did
not justify federal preemption.6 3 The court held that the theoretical
possibility of conflict between the federal and state laws was not
enough to justify preemption.' The court further held that the purposes of federal labor laws would not be frustrated by state anti-takeover laws.65 It reasoned that Congress did not intend federal labor
laws to prevent states from determining the legality of activities
through laws of general applicability.6 6 The court also held that the
state's interest in controlling anti-takeover provisions outweighed the
federal interest in avoiding the interference of state laws.6 7
III.

BARGAINING AGREEMENT PREEMPTION OF STATE
ANTI-TAKEOVER LAW

Due to conflicts between labor agreements and state law, UAL Corp.
raises a question of bargaining agreement preemption. Under bargaining agreement preemption, federal labor law should preempt state
anti-takeover law for two reasons: first, state anti-takeover laws
directly conflict with federal labor law; and second, anti-takeover laws
frustrate the purposes of federal labor law.
A.

The Conflict of State Anti-Takeover Law with FederalLabor
Law

State anti-takeover laws conflict directly with federal labor law in
two vital ways. First, state laws may conflict with the federal mandate
60. UAL Corp. I, 699 F. Supp. at 1334.
61. Id. at 1333.
62. Id. at 1332. Here, contract interpretation preemption seems misplaced. While this
analysis would be appropriate if the pilots' association had sued for damages, the analysis does
not apply to a direct challenge to the validity of a labor agreement. See supra note 3 1.
63. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 874 F.2d 439, 447 (7th Cir. 1989) (UAL Corp.
II).

64.
65.
66.
67.
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Id. at 446.
Id.
Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 130-33.
UAL Corp. 11, 874 F.2d at 447; see infra text accompanying notes 134-40.
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that employers and employees bargain over anti-takeover provisions
such as ESOP and contract expiration clauses.6 8 Second, anti-takeover laws may attempt to invalidate federally sanctioned collective
bargaining agreements. Whereas bargaining agreement preemption
normally requires state laws that conflict with federal labor law to
yield, the Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to this general preemption rule; anti-takeover laws, however, do not fall within
these exceptions.
L

State Anti-Takeover Law Conflicts with the Federally Mandated
Duty to Bargain

State anti-takeover law directly conflicts with federal labor law that
mandates bargaining over anti-takeover provisions.6 9 UAL Corporation's management had a mandatory duty to bargain with the machinists over the two anti-takeover provisions. 70 Similar anti-takeover
provisions such as job security agreements, 7 1 severance pay agreements, 72 and successorship clauses73 also create mandatory duties to
bargain.
In conflict with these mandatory duties, state anti-takeover laws, in
effect, may prohibit inclusion of anti-takeover provisions in labor
68. The duty to bargain over decisions to sell or close part or all of a business is beyond the
scope of this Note. The Supreme Court has, however, indicated that employers need not
negotiate over such core management decisions. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452
U.S. 666, 686 (1981). Anti-takeover provisions can take many forms other than provisions
addressing a decision to sell or abandon a corporation. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying
text.
69. Because bargaining over anti-takeover provisions has not been litigated prior to UAL
Corp., no holding states precisely this point; nevertheless, well developed case law concerning the
duty to bargain leaves little doubt that parties must negotiate over the anti-takeover provisions
discussed in this Note. See supra notes 16, 21.
70. The first protective provision preserved the machinists' statutory right under section 156
of the RLA. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982); UAL Corp. 1I 874 F.2d at 442. Though unions
customarily waived this right in negotiations, Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 717 F.
Supp. 575, 580 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (UAL Corp. II), the parties still had an obligation to negotiate
over the waiver. Cf supra notes 16, 21.
The second protective provision dealt with an ESOP. The Seventh Circuit recognized this
provision as a wage substitute and a mandatory subject of bargaining. UAL Corp. II, 874 F.2d at
445. Similarly, other courts have found stock purchase and profit sharing plans to be mandatory
subjects of bargaining. See supra note 21.
71. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330, 336-338 (1960).
72. Severance pay agreements fall within the Court's rule that employers must negotiate over
the effects of abandonment or sale. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666,
677-78 n.15 (1981).
73. Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 545, 556 (10th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S.
911 (1981).
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agreements.1 4 In UAL Corp. III, for example, the district court concluded that, when applying the rule that management actions must be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed by a hostile bid,7 5 any labor
agreement's anti-takeover provisions will necessarily violate Delaware
law because the irredeemable nature of such provisions makes them
unreasonable.76 Federal and state laws therefore conflict, because
state law prohibits the inclusion of a federally mandated bargaining
subject in an agreement.
The Seventh Circuit failed adequately to consider this irreconcilable
conflict between state and federal laws. The court granted that "the
even-handed application of Delaware corporation law might forbid an
anti-takeover measure contained in a labor contract," but found no
justification for protecting such measures. 77 The court held that such
contract provisions did not warrant the protection of labor laws since
the provisions were not necessary to reduce the number of transportation strikes and were not commonly included in labor agreements. 8
These conclusions by the Seventh Circuit, however, ignore the weight
of judicial authority.
First, the Seventh Circuit ignored the fact that labor law mandates
bargaining over the subjects of sections B(l)(b) and C.7 9 While federal
law does not dictate inclusion of these particular provisions, interference with the right to negotiate over them would frustrate the goals of
federal labor law.8" As Justice Harlan noted: "The right to bargain
74. In UAL Corp. III, the district court suggested that it did not intend that every antitakeover provision in a collective bargaining agreement receive heightened review under state
law. 717 F. Supp. at 586. Despite this disclaimer, the court stated: "A board of directors,
however, cannot under the guise of labor relations accomplish what state law prohibits." Id.
This statement implies that all labor provisions must conform to state law. In the case of antitakeover provisions, if the irredeemable nature of these provisions makes them unreasonable and
unfair, then such provisions must violate state law.
75. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). For a discussion of
Unocal standards, see supra note 4.
76. 717 F. Supp. at 588; see supra note 7.
77. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 874 F.2d 439, 446 (7th Cir. 1989) (UAL Corp.
II).
78. Id.
79. See 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1982); see also supra notes 16,
21-22, 70. The Seventh Circuit never addressed the mandatory nature of these sections in its
preemption discussion. Earlier in its decision, however, the court held section C to involve a
mandatory subject of bargaining. UAL Corp. IA 874 F.2d at 445.
80. "The application [of state law] would frustrate the parties' solution of a problem which
Congress has required them to negotiate in good faith toward solving, and in the solution of
which it imposed no limitations relevant here." Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358
U.S. 283, 295-96 (1959); cf Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S.
548, 570 (1930) ("Such collective action would be a mockery if representation were made futile
by interferences with freedom of choice.").
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becomes illusory if one is not free to press a proposal in good faith to
the point of insistence.""1
Second, the Seventh Circuit erroneously decided that anti-takeover
provisions do not serve the purposes of the RLA because they do not
reduce the number or severity of transportation strikes. 2 In this analysis, the court failed to mention that another purpose of the RLA is
"to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes" 3
concerning such mandatory subjects. Sections B(l)(b) and C fulfilled
this latter purpose. Moreover, these anti-takeover provisions may
have prevented a transportation strike. After UAL and the machinists
had reached a stalemate in negotiations, the machinists resurrected
their anti-takeover proposals.8 4 The parties then reached an agreement because the machinists granted major concessions in exchange
for these provisions.8 5
Finally, even if the anti-takeover provisions did not prevent a strike
in this case, by applying state law to void legitimate labor agreement
provisions, the court's approach could increase the chance of future
strikes.8 6 The Supreme Court has recognized that such theoretical
possibilities justify labor preemption. 7 In short, because sections
B(l)(b) and C fulfill both the settlement and strike avoidance purposes
of the RLA, federal law should preempt any state attempt to regulate
these labor agreement provisions.
Third, the Seventh Circuit mistakenly assumed that a lack of litigation over anti-takeover provisions eliminated the necessity for protecting these provisions under federal labor law. 8 While courts consider
industry bargaining patterns when defining the proper scope of
mandatory bargaining, past practice is only one indication of this
81. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 352 (1958) (Harlan, L,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
82. UAL Corp. I1, 874 F.2d at 446.
83. H. LUSTGARTEN, supra note 16, at 243-44. In all, the RLA listed five purposes for the
Act. Id.
84. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1309, 1322-26 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(UAL Corp. 1).
85. Id. at 1326. For a discussion of these concessions, see infra note 115.
86. "By encumbering carriers with additional duties arising out of state law, the collective
bargaining process will be impaired. Forcing carriers to comply with state law duties in addition
to those imposed by the RLA may make the difference between striking an agreement and just
plain striking." UAL Corp. I, 699 F. Supp. at 1333.
87. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959).
88. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 874 F.2d 439, 446-47 (7th Cir. 1989) (UAL
Corp. I).
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scope. s9 Any absolute rule limiting mandatory bargaining to past
practice could stifle the expansion of collective bargaining into new
areas and prevent the adaptation of labor law to changing conditions.9" Regardless, sections B(1)(b) and C were not innovative and
untested provisions.9" ESOP and contract expiration clauses have been
recognized as mandatory subjects of bargaining for the past thirty
years.9 2 Because sections B(1)(b) and C concern mandatory subjects
of bargaining, federal law should protect them through bargaining
agreement preemption.
2. State Anti-Takeover Law Conflicts with Federally Sanctioned
Labor Agreements
Aside from the direct conflict between federal and state laws, state
anti-takeover laws should be preempted because they attempt to invalidate federally sanctioned labor agreements. Such collective bargaining agreements carry the authority of federal law.9 3 As noted by the
Supreme Court, "the paramount force of the federal law remains even
though it is expressed in the details of a contract federal law empowers
the parties to make, rather than in terms in an enactment of Congress." 9 4 Because such agreements are equivalent to congressionally
approved legislation, 95 they preempt conflicting state laws.96
The Seventh Circuit failed to address this issue. Even if Delaware's
anti-takeover law does not directly conflict with a federal statute, the
state's law does conflict with a federally sanctioned collective bargaining agreement. Yet, the court applied state law to strike down the
89. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 675-76 n.14 (1981);
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 560 (1957) (parties have the right to bargain about the
exceptional as well as the routine).
90. Current corporate practices have raised issues which Congress could not foresee when it
passed the RLA and NLRA. See FirstNat'l MaintenanceCorp., 452 U.S. at 679. Likewise, future
changes in corporate practices could cause a continued metamorphosis of bargaining subjects.
91. Ironically, anti-takeover provisions are common enough that the pilots' association,
plaintiffs in this case, had sought them in negotiations with other airlines. Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
Int'l v. UAL Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1309, 1312 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (UAL Corp. 1).
92. See supra note 70.
93. "A union agreement made pursuant to the Railway Labor Act has, therefore, the
imprimatur of the federal law upon it and, by force of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the
Constitution, could not be made illegal nor vitiated by any provision of the laws of a State."
Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956).
94. Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 296-97 (1959).
95. For a discussion of potential nondelegation doctrine arguments, see Note, Private
Preemption of State Labor Laws: A ConstitutionalObjection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1099 (1980).
96. Oliver, 358 U.S. at 296-97.

468

Labor Law Preemption of Anti-Takeover Law
parties' federally sanctioned agreement.9 7 This holding places state
law above federal law and contravenes Supreme Court precedent.
The preemption of state law in this case would comport with judicial precedent. The Supreme Court has held state antitrust laws and
state civil service laws preempted when they have conflicted with the
terms of collective bargaining agreements.9 8 Similarly, lower courts
have held state industrial commission orders and state statutes of limitations preempted.9 9 These precedents justify the preemption of state
anti-takeover laws that conflict with federal labor law. In this case,
Delaware anti-takeover law conflicts with the mandatory duty of the
parties to bargain over sections B(l)(b) and C, and their concomitant
freedom to agree to these terms. Accordingly, Delaware anti-takeover
law should be preempted.
3. State Anti-Takeover Law Does Not Fall Within Exceptions to
FederalPreemption
While state laws normally must yield to conflicting federal labor
laws, the Supreme Court has recognized three limited exceptions to
this general preemption rule. However, state anti-takeover laws as
applied to labor provisions discussed in this Note do not fall within
these exceptions. The first exception applies to areas that Congress
intended to leave open for state regulation." ° The Seventh Circuit
found that Congress left corporate regulation to the states, but never
discussed whether Congress intended state corporate law to control
matters also covered by federal labor law.10 1 While the legislative history provides no evidence that Congress specifically considered state
anti-takeover laws when it enacted the RLA and NLRA,102 Congress
apparently did intend to avoid legislative interference with collective
bargaining agreements.10 3 By deciding to leave corporate law to the
states, Congress did not decide that state corporate laws would be
immune from federal labor law preemption.
The Court has recognized a second exception for state laws that
regulate local health and safety. 1" The two provisions in UAL Corp.,
97.
II).
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
Corp.,
103.
104.

Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 874 F.2d 439, 447 (7th Cir. 1989) (UAL Corp.
See supra text accompanying notes 39-45.
See supra notes 41-42.
Malone v. White Motor Corp. 435 U.S. 497, 514 (1978).
See UAL Corp. II, 874 F.2d at 447.
Indeed, as late as 1968, only one state had an anti-takeover statute. See Edgar v. MITE
457 U.S. 624, 631 n.6 (1982).
H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 34.
Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 297 (1959).
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and the other possible anti-takeover provisions discussed in this Note,
deal with wage substitutes and contract duration, not local health and
safety regulations. The provisions, therefore, fall outside this
exception.
A third exception applies to state legislation, such as minimum
wage laws, that imposes minimal substantive requirements on labor
contracts. 105 The Court justifies this exception as an added protection
for workers, and extends it only to requirements placed on employers.
In this case, state anti-takeover laws impose no minimum substantive
labor requirements and so fall outside the third exception.
The Seventh Circuit did not attempt to fit its decision into one of
these three recognized exceptions. Instead, the court mistakenly considered the importance of state corporate law. 106 When state and federal laws conflict, however, the Supremacy Clause requires state laws
to yield regardless of their importance.107
B.

The Frustrationof FederalLabor Law Purposes by State AntiTakeover Laws

The Supreme Court has held that state laws that frustrate the purposes of federal labor law generally must be preempted.° 8 However,
legislation that only peripherally touches federal labor law and concerns a deeply rooted state interest need not be preempted.' 019 In UAL
Corp. II, the Seventh Circuit disregarded Supreme Court precedent,
holding that "a judgment about preemption requires a weighing of federal and state interests.""' The court then discussed two state concerns, but never fully addressed the frustration of federal law."'
105. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 754-55 (1985).
106. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 874 F.2d 439, 447 (7th Cir. 1989) (UAL Corp.
11). The Seventh Circuit rested upon the importance of state law despite contrary precedent: in
its only consideration of the conflict between state corporate law and federal labor law, the
Supreme Court held that state antitrust law was not exempt from bargaining agreement
preemption. Oliver, 358 U.S. at 297.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26. For a further discussion of state law
considerations, see infra text accompanying notes 134-40.
108. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959); cf Savage v.
Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912) (if a state law will frustrate the operation of a federal law within
its chosen field, the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress).
109. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44.
110. UAL Corp. II,874 F.2d at 447.
111. Id. at 446-47. For a discussion of the two state concerns, see infra text accompanying
notes 129-40.
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1.

State Anti-Takeover Laws FrustratePurposes of FederalLabor
Law

A full consideration of federal interests reveals that state anti-takeover laws frustrate three of the basic purposes of federal labor law,
thereby justifying bargaining agreement preemption. First, anti-takeover laws impinge upon the bargaining process mandated by federal
labor law. Congress created a bargaining process based on economic
strength' 1 2 and left the outcome of this process to be determined by

the parties."

3

State anti-takeover laws may interfere with this pro-

11 4

cess.
By voiding certain aspects of the labor agreement in UAL
Corp. II, the Seventh Circuit retroactively restructured the parties'
bargain, undermining the process of compromise which led to the
agreement.' 15 The threat of such retroactive restructuring could dangerously decrease the likelihood of innovative labor-management compromises" 6 and increase the incentive for management fraud in
7
negotiations."
Second, anti-takeover laws destroy the uniformity of federal labor

law. To the extent that states may limit the subjects of bargaining
through local legislation, negotiators must adjust bargaining agreements based on local dictate. If some states allowed a particular
agreement provision, while others proscribed it, concluding nation112. See supra note 29.
113. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1976) (considering bargaining under the NLRA); Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis v.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6 (1943) (considering bargaining under the RLA).
114. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1309, 1333 (N.D. IIl. 1988)
(UAL Corp. I); see infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
115. The bargaining process encourages both labor and management to compromise. If labor
desires anti-takeover protections, "[n]o doubt it will be impelled, in seeking these ends, to offer
concessions, information, and alternatives that might be helpful to management." First Nat'l
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1981). Assuming that labor agrees to forego
other benefits to secure anti-takeover protections, a judicial invalidation of these protections
would change the parties' bargain and result in unrewarded concessions by employees. In the
present case, IAM agreed to seven-day per week coverage without overtime pay at the San
Francisco maintenance base, a concession that United had sought for nearly forty years. UAL
Corp. 1, 699 F. Supp. at 1326. By invalidating the anti-takeover provisions, the court awarded
UAL management key concessions at no cost.
116. If courts apply state law to void aspects of labor-management agreements, a party who
accepts an untested provision risks losing the provision based on later adjudications of state law.
This disincentive to innovation could increase stalemated negotiations and labor unrest.
117. By evaluating anti-takeover provisions in labor contracts based on the actions or
intentions of management, courts allow management to negotiate with labor freely. Labor, when
it accepts an anti-takeover provision as a trade-off for concessions, gambles that management has
acted with proper authority. But misrepresentations of authority would not harm management;
instead, such misrepresentations could result in court-restructured contracts favoring
management.
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wide labor agreements could become impossible. Such an impossibility would have a major impact on bargaining because many labor
organizations have nationwide memberships and national or multicarrier bargaining has become commonplace. 1 8 Further, if the Seventh Circuit's dictum that Delaware law would not prohibit anti-takeover provisions at all times is to be believed," 9 then the acceptability
of an anti-takeover provision could turn on the timing of the proposal
within the particular state.' 2 ° This would result in inconsistent labor
law even within a particular state. Congress intended to avoid this
type of nonuniformity when it created the RLA and the NLRA.' 2 '
Third, as applied in UAL Corp. II, state anti-takeover laws prevent
employees from protecting their collective interests. Federal labor
laws guarantee employees the right to bargain for protection of their
collective interests.' 2 2 Within this guarantee, ESOP and contract expiration clauses are mandatory subjects of bargaining,' 2 3 and bargaining
for anti-takeover provisions could easily fall within the scope of the
NLRA's "other mutual aid and protection" clause.' 2 4 Yet, the Seventh Circuit's decision precludes this protection.' 25 Moreover,
because anti-takeover laws guarantee only consideration of shareholder wealth, not employee interests, 126 these state laws offer employees no means to protect themselves.' 27 By placing shareholder
118.

See H. LUSTGARTEN, supra note 16, at 72-74.

119. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 874 F.2d 439, 447 (7th Cir. 1989) (UAL Corp.
11); see supra note 74 (discussing the district court's dicta on this issue).
120. Approval of a provision based on its timing might influence the parties' choice of
bargaining times, and could create a disincentive to settlement until a provision was legally
acceptable.
121. Consistency was a primary purpose of federal labor legislation. See Lingle v. Norge Div.
of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1881 (1988).
122. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330, 340 (1960). See
generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 18, at 72-76.
123. For a discussion of these clauses, see supra note 70.
124. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Congress was motivated by a concern for the collective
interests of employees when it passed the NLRA; therefore, this clause probably protects against
anticipated, but unforeseeable threats to the collective interests of employees. Anti-takeover
provisions may provide precisely this type of protection. Because employees have no means to
protect their collective interests outside of bargaining, anti-takeover provisions provide the type
of fundamental protection against an unforeseen threat which Congress must have intended. See
also supra note 22.
125. See supra notes 7, 74.
126. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986)
(director action must advance "the goal of stockholder wealth maximization"), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 182 (Del. 1986) (once target's board decides to sell the corporation, it is restricted to
conducting a fair and open auction for the exclusive benefit of the shareholders).
127. "The traditional and still dominant view is that managers represent the shareholders....
[E]mployees create and protect their interests through contracts with the corporation." Oesterle,
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interests over employee interests, interests the corporation need not
Circuit leaves employees with no protection
consider, the Seventh
128
from takeovers.
2.

The Seventh CircuitErroneously ConsideredState Interests

State anti-takeover laws frustrate basic purposes of federal labor law
and, therefore, should be preempted. Because these state laws do more
than peripherally touch labor law, the importance of the state interests
129
behind these laws has no bearing on determination of preemption.
Rather than consider the basic federal purposes favoring protection of
negotiated anti-takeover provisions, however, the Seventh Circuit considered two state concerns: the validity of state laws of general applicability, and the importance of state corporate law.
First, the court erroneously held that federal labor statutes do not
exempt parties to collective bargaining agreements from state laws of
general applicability.' 30 The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly
rejected any exception to preemption for laws of general applicability. 3' Even if the Supreme Court had not rejected this exemption,
state anti-takeover statutes are not laws of general applicability. Antitakeover laws do not apply to the general public, but narrowly focus
on precisely the same business combinations to which labor law
applies.' 3 2 Even within this narrow scope, Delaware law allows management to protect itself with golden parachute provisions in executive
contracts' 33 while denying organized employees the same opportunity
for protection. Such discriminatory state laws cannot be described as
generally applicable; they are ripe for preemption.
The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the DelawareSupreme Court, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 117, 138 (1986).
128. Even an anti-takeover agreement achieved through a strike could be invalidated under
the Seventh Circuit's analysis. If management did not properly consider shareholder interests,
then a court could void the agreement. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
954-55 (Del. 1985). Even if management did consider shareholder interests, in the face of a
profitable tender offer a court could still void the agreement as unreasonable in relation to the
threat posed since it is non-redeemable. See also supra notes 4, 7.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
130. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 874 F.2d 439, 446 (7th Cir. 1989) (UAL Corp.
II).
131. "Rijt is well settled that the general applicability of a state cause of action is not sufficient
to exempt it from pre-emption." Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 25, 430
U.S. 290, 300 (1977); accord San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244
(1959). But ef New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 533 (1979)
(plurality) (although not a sufficient reason to exempt a state law from preemption, general
applicability makes a court less likely to preempt).
132. See Cox, LaborLaw Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337, 1357 (1972).
133. See R. GILSON, THE LAW & FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 670 (1986).
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Second, the Seventh Circuit recognized corporate law as a matter of
primary state responsibility.' 34 The court refused "to deal the body
blow to state regulation of corporations[,]" reasoning that federal preemption would allow any corporation to "adopt anti-takeover measures with complete impunity, simply by writing them into the
collective bargaining agreement." 135 Despite the court's emphatic language, it never identified a deeply rooted state interest in the enforcement of anti-takeover laws and never justified placing this state
interest over the basic purposes of federal labor law.
State interests in anti-takeover laws deserve little deference 136 and
do not require that these laws be applied to invalidate terms of labor
agreements. The only identifiable justification for state anti-takeover
laws is to protect corporate shareholders; bargaining agreement preemption, however, would not injure shareholders. Shareholders can
hold corporate directors accountable whether or not labor law
preempts state law as it applies to labor agreements. If directors agree
to self-serving anti-takeover provisions in labor contracts, shareholders may bring suit against the directors for violation of their .fiduciary
duties as expressed in the business judgment rule.' 37 The shareholders
may also remove the offending directors, or replace them in the next
board election. 1 38 Federal preemption would not, therefore, deal a
"body blow" to state control over corporations; adequate shareholder
remedies remain. Moreover, to the extent that the corporation receives
important labor concessions in exchange for anti-takeover provisions,
shareholder interests may actually be advanced by allowing them. 39
Even if the state interest in its anti-takeover law is significant, this
interest does not justify frustration of the federal labor scheme. None
of the Supreme Court cases cited by the Seventh Circuit to establish
the importance of state corporate law placed the state interest above
134. UAL Corp. II, 874 F.2d at 447.
135. Id.

136. The Supreme Court has not generally deferred to state anti-takeover laws. See Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (applying the dormant commerce clause to strike down
an Illinois anti-takeover law). In addition, at least one commentator has attacked the motives
behind Delaware's corporate laws. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 701 (1974) ("a pygmy among the 50 states prescribes, interprets,

and indeed denigrates national corporate policy as an incentive to encourage incorporation
within its borders, thereby increasing its revenue").
137. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Del. 1984). Such a suit could raise a

question of contract interpretation preemption. See supra note 31.
138. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 8.03-8.08 (1985); Auer v. Dressel, 306
N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590, 593 (1954). While shareholders have the right to challenge present

directors, however, such proxy campaigns are rarely successful.
139. This occurred in UAL Corp. See supra note 115.
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the federal interest in uniform labor law. Significantly, when the federal labor scheme has conflicted with other important state areas,
courts have held state antitrust laws and statutes of limitations
preempted.140
IV.

CONCLUSION

UAL Corp., a case of first impression, presented a conflict between
state anti-takeover law and federal labor law and posed the question
whether a state could apply its anti-takeover law to invalidate provisions in a collective bargaining agreement. The Seventh Circuit held
that federal labor law did not preempt the application of state antitakeover law. Despite the court's erroneous holding, the weight of
judicial authority indicates that federal labor law required bargaining
agreement preemption in this case. Delaware's anti-takeover law
directly conflicted with the parties' duty to bargain over mandatory
subjects, struck down provisions of a federally sanctioned collective
bargaining agreement, and frustrated basic purposes of federal labor
law. In particular, application of the Delaware law denied these
employees their only opportunity for protection against the harmful
effects of a takeover- the right to bargain.
The court should have remedied both the conflict with and the frustration of federal labor law by preempting the Delaware law. Preemption would have preserved the integrity of federal labor law without
endangering the rights of corporate shareholders. Shareholders could
still challenge self-serving actions by directors through suits for
breaches of fiduciary duties and through proxy campaigns.
Future courts that encounter cases where state anti-takeover laws
apply to collective bargaining agreements should decline to follow the
Seventh Circuit's UAL Corp. decision. These courts instead should
apply bargaining agreement preemption to displace state laws.
Patrick M, Madden

140. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.

